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successfully combines the richness of individual case studies with 
the need to generalize from broad comparisons. In demonstrating 
the potential of the comparative case study approach, the authors 
challenge future researchers to discover the peculiar "institutional 
identities" of state supreme courts across the nation. 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORI-
CAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION. By Robert L. 
Cord.1 Baker Book House. 1988. Originally published: 
Lambeth Press, 1982. Pp. 302. $19.95. 
CHRISTIANITY AND THE STATE. By Rousas John 
Rushdoony. Ross House Books. 1986. Pp. 192. 
Steven D. Smith 2 
If book reviews carried subtitles, this one could be called "The 
Mechanic and the Manichee." Those terms suggest the character, 
and the shortcomings, of Professor Robert Cord's and Dr. Rousas 
Rushdoony's respective efforts to examine the issues of religious 
freedom from a historical perspective. Each book has its merits. 
Professor Cord pulls together a mass of (sometimes) helpful histori-
cal data to deflate some mischievous historical myths. Dr. 
Rushdoony offers unorthodox (and therefore potentially valuable) 
insights and perspectives. The critical comments that follow should 
not be understood as disparaging these achievements. For different 
reasons, however, neither book establishes a genuine conversation 
with the past. Hence, neither book finds a historical antidote for the 
current doctrinal and theoretical malaise. 
I 
A book may be unpersuasive without being unimportant. And 
in fact, Cord's is an important book that imparts an important 
truth. The book is important because it has become a cornerstone 
of sorts for the "nonpreferentialist" school of establishment clause 
jurisprudence-a school that claims among its adherents the cur-
rent Chief Justice.J The important truth that emerges from Cord's 
I. Attorney. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. 
3. The Rehnquist dissent in Wallace v. Jatfree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985), adopts Cord's 
position that the establishment clause was intended to prevent establishment of a national 
church but was not intended to prevent public aid to religion so long as such aid is non prefer-
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analysis is that the "framers" (whoever they were; Cord pays little 
attention to this or other jurisprudential questions posed by critics 
of originalism) almost certainly did not intend to exclude religion 
from the public sphere, or to establish a purely secular government. 
Cord is not the first scholar to debunk the "secular govern-
ment" thesis, however, and he is far from being the most persuasive. 
The book's problems are rooted, I think, in the way Cord frames his 
analysis. He sets up his discussion as a sort of debate between him-
self and the modern proponents of the secularist construction, in-
cluding Leo Pfeffer, Justice Rutledge, and Justice Black. This 
debate format produces a numbing redundancy in the presentation 
of the evidence. Cord takes on the secularists one-by-one; and he 
keeps trotting out the same facts over and over again-congres-
sional chaplains, Thanksgiving proclamations, treaties that subsi-
dized proselytizing and preaching among the Indians-to show that 
Pfeffer was mistaken, that Justice Rutledge was mistaken, that Jus-
tice Black was mistaken, that the later Justice Douglas was 
mistaken. 
Cord's debating posture also leads to the kind of bickering that 
one expects in, say, presidential campaigns, but that is unedifying in 
scholarly analysis. For example, he revels in quoting the more un-
guarded or unqualified statements of opponents like Pfeffer, and 
then observing that "[t]he Pfeffer thesis ... is an absolute one that is 
logically disproven by the mere showing of one exception." One 
may concede the point: If Cord had a private wager going with 
Pfeffer about whether the framers wanted "absolute separation," 
Cord would win the bet. But the Supreme Court has not adopted-
nor is it likely to adopt-any requirement of "absolute separation." 
By turning the question into a private quarrel, Cord makes his anal-
ysis less illuminating on the live public issues. 
More important, by joining issue with Pfeffer and Rutledge, 
Cord allows his opponents to dictate both the methodology and the 
terms of the debate-with unfortunate consequences. Pfeifer-Rut-
ledge historiography is not noteworthy for its sensitivity to histori-
cal climate of opinion, to the nuances and ambiguities and 
individual differences in the thinking of the framers, or to "the un-
noted change in the meaning of familiar words and the consequent 
transformation of controlling concepts"4 that divides the twentieth 
century from the eighteenth. As Cord shows, Pfeffer and Rutledge 
ential or nondiscriminatory among different religions. And Rehnquist"s supporting argument 
amounts to a succinct presentation of the evidence discussed in Cord's book. 
4. liowe, The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American Con-
stitutional History 154 ( 1965). 
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used history selectively and mechanically to advance their own po-
sition on church-state relations; their history is consequently unil-
luminating about what the eighteenth century Americans who 
adopted the establishment clause actually believed that they had 
decided. 
Unfortunately, though Cord's historical conclusions are differ-
ent, his historiography is disappointingly similar to that of his oppo-
nents. Like Pfeffer and Rutledge, Cord focuses largely upon the 
beliefs of Madison and Jefferson. He makes little effort to explore 
the complex ways in which these men were shaped by, and re-
sponded to, philosophical and cultural influences. Cord has little 
patience for incongruity or uncertainty in his subjects. For in-
stance, Madison's own doubts, acknowledged later in life, about the 
permissibility of legislative chaplains and Thanksgiving proclama-
tions, are brushed aside with the pious assertion that if he had truly 
felt doubts he would never have supported such measures. Cord 
concedes that Madison may have changed his mind after leaving 
office-Madison's own words compel at least this minimal conces-
sion-but he cannot conceive of a Madison who while in office was 
either ambivalent about the meaning of religious freedom or capable 
of acting from political expediency. As in a bad novel, Cord's char-
acters lack human complexity. 
By refusing to take the framers on their own terms, this unsub-
tle approach to history virtually ensures historical misunderstand-
ing and, consequently, a distorted view of the establishment clause's 
original meaning. It foists upon the framers an equation that they 
would not have accepted. Beginning with Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation, the central question that modern lawyers have chosen to ad-
dress is whether the establishment clause prohibited government 
from advancing religion. That question has commonly been con-
flated with another question: Did the establishment clause require 
"separation of church and state"? "Separation," in short, has been 
treated as synonymous with "no advancement." When the ques-
tions are framed in this way, the answers are virtually foreordained: 
The establishment clause plainly required "separation," and there-
fore the clause prohibits government from advancing or support-
ing-or, more recently, endorsing-religion. 
A few scholars, like Cord, have pointed out that this "no ad-
vancement" construction is hard to square with the evidence show-
ing that both state and national governments during the early 
constitutional period consciously advanced and endorsed religion in 
various ways. Thus, Cord's history accepts the modern questions 
and tries to provide different answers. But even if the evidence 
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seems to support Cord's answers, the debate as currently framed 
makes his position embarrassing. Does Cord really want to repudi-
ate the idea of separation of church and state-a principle that vir-
tually all Americans, at least since Jefferson, have regarded as 
axiomatic? And if the establishment clause did not forbid aid to 
religion, then what exactly did it do? 
Cord has responses to these objections, but his responses do 
not allay the embarrassment. It turns out that Cord is not opposed 
to "separation of church and state"-only to "absolute separation" 
(whatever that means). And although the establishment clause did 
not forbid government to aid or advance religion, the clause was not 
a meaningless gesture; its purpose was to prohibit preferential treat-
ment of any of the various religions. But this construction immedi-
ately runs into historical difficulties of its own: Indian treaties 
which specifically subsidized the Catholic Church or the United 
Brethren, for example, or the appointment of congressional chap-
lains (who presumably did not represent all Christian denomina-
tions). Cord tries to explain away these apparent discrepancies, but 
without much success. For example, Madison's support for legisla-
tion requiring Sabbath observance was ostensibly "nonpreferential" 
because in his day all Virginians (well, almost all Virginians)s were 
Christians anyway. But Madison's contemporaneous opposition to 
the Virginia Assessments Bill, under which any Christian denomi-
nation would have been eligible for public assistance, is explained 
with the observation that the bill would have favored Christianity, 
thereby discriminating against non-Christian religions. Something 
seems amiss here. Similar discrepancies pervade Cord's analysis of 
specific issues, past and present; Cord hands out judgments of 
"preferential" or "nonpreferential" in a fashion that reminds one of 
... well, the way the Supreme Court finds (or fails to find) "secular 
purposes" or "excessive entanglement. "6 
These unhappy consequences follow from Cord's acceptance of 
the debate as framed by Pfeffer, Rutledge, and other proponents of 
secular government. The modern habit has been to regard "separa-
tion," "secularism," and "no aid" as interchangeable concepts. The 
framers' generation recognized no such equation. So long as the 
modern habit is indulged, there is virtually no possibility of a com-
prehending conversation with those who adopted the establishment 
clause. 
5. There was a small community of Jews living in Richmond in the colonial period. I 
S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 573 (1972). 
6. For a persuasive historical criticism of the "no preference" analysis of history, see 
Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim about Original Intent, 27 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 875 (1986). 
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A more senstttve historical analysis might have suggested a 
way out of this difficulty. Consider the pivotal premise in 
Madison's famous Memorial and Remonstrance, written in opposi-
tion to the Assessments Bill: "Before any man can be considered as 
a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the 
Governor of the Universe .... " Hence, "[i]t is the duty of every 
man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he 
believes to be acceptable to him." For Madison, it seems, religious 
liberty was grounded in religious premises; and explicitly religious 
rationales could be publicly invoked to support separation of 
church and state (but not, manifestly, a secular public sphere sani-
tized of religious values and influences). Reflection upon Madison's 
argument might go a long way toward dissolving the equation of 
"separation" and "secularism" that has pervaded modern discus-
sions of the establishment clause. 7 
Instead, Cord peremptorily dismisses most of the Memorial as 
not "germane." His explanation is that "most of Madison's 'ideo-
logical' arguments in the 'Memorial' seem more derivative of the 
call to revolution rather than the proper yardstick against which to 
measure an appropriate separation between Church and State in a 
real society where both institutions must coexist." I confess that 
this argument baffies me. Madison wrote his Memorial some two 
years after the end of the Revolutionary War, and he wrote it not as 
an exercise in academic theory but in an effort (successful, as it 
turned out) to dissuade real legislators from enacting a real bill. 
How much more "real" can you get? 
The reality, it seems, is that Cord cannot learn from the Me-
morial for the same reason that the secularists he opposes cannot. 
Much in the manner of a lawyer examining a hostile witness, both 
camps have insisted that Madison speak to their questions in their 
terms, and have refused to hear what Madison was actually trying 
to say. With Cord's casual dismissal of the Memorial, the opportu-
nity for genuinely helpful historical insight is lost. Thus, while ex-
posing defects in the Pfeffer-Rutledge position, Cord ultimately 
succumbs to the same modernist errors that infect his opponents. 
II 
For Rousas Rushdoony, by contrast, "modernist" assumptions 
are hardly a problem. On the contrary, Rushdoony offers a roving 
indictment of modern notions about the relations between church 
7. For my own attempt to escape this debilitating equation in reconstructing the origi· 
nal meaning of the establishment clause, see Smith. Separation and the "'Secular"": Recon-
structing the Disestablishment Decision. 67 TEX. L. REV. 1195 ( 1989). 
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and state. Though generally historical in character, his discussion 
does not adopt a chronological organization--or any other organi-
zation that I can discern-but instead leaps from ancient Greece to 
modern times, back to Constantinian Rome, forward to the Enlight-
enment, back to Old Testament Israel, forward again to the present, 
back to the Middle Ages and the Gregorian reforms and Marsilius 
of Padua and the Conciliar Movement and the Inquisition and on 
and on with astonishing agility. These historical acrobatics all re-
turn to a recurring motif: Modern civilization has rejected the 
supremacy of God in favor of the sovereignty of man. This rejec-
tion expresses itself in the form of humanism, statism, fascism, and 
the idolatry that seeks salvation in the messianic state. 
The sovereignty of man creates an unhappy situation for Chris-
tians, who can escape persecution only by sacrificing their faith and 
embracing the reigning humanistic theology. But the current situa-
tion cannot endure; because true legitimacy requires acceptance of 
the authority of God, the humanistic state survives only by usurp-
ing more and more power, and in the long run must collapse. What 
is needed is a new theology of the state which acknowledges "the 
crown rights of Christ the King." Rushdoony concludes on an 
apocalyptic note: 
[T)he conflict between church and state ... is more than a jurisdictional dispute 
now: it is a religious conflict. and a war unto death. The modern humanistic state is 
history's most jealous god, and it will tolerate no rivals. Hence, its war against 
Christianity. In this struggle, however, the state has taken on a power far greater 
than itself. As the humanistic world powers take ··counsel," planning to overthrow 
His law and government, "He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh: the LORD 
shall have them in derision·· (Ps. 2:4). He shall break his enemies with a rod of iron. 
Rushdoony's book does little to enhance constitutional under-
standing, but it is important to be clear about why this is so. It 
would be easy to dismiss the book out of hand simply because of its 
unapologetically religious orientation. That would be a mistake. 
Considering the current condition of church-state doctrine, we have 
no business rejecting possible illumination from any source, reli-
gious or otherwise. Scholars working from religious premises have 
often provided thoughtful analyses of politics and government; John 
Courtney Murray and Reinhold Niebuhr are modern examples. As 
a historical matter, moreover, the defense of religious freedom 
rested heavily upon religious premises; consider, for example, 
Locke's A Letter Concerning Toleration or Madison's Memorial and 
Remonstrance. Thus, in arguing that religious liberty must be 
grounded in religion, Rushdoony may actually come closer to the 
framers' point of view than does either Cord or an apostle of 
secularism. 
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Indeed, Rushdoony's religious perspective frees him from 
debilitating modernist assumptions, and thereby generates occa-
sional helpful insights. For instance, he insists that a community 
cannot do without a "religion" of some kind, even if it is a secular 
or humanistic one. Hence, the modern state's "myth of neutrality" 
merely means that the state has discarded one form of religion-
Christianity-in favor of another one. A critic might quarrel with 
Rushdoony's terminology, and his argument hardly demonstrates 
that "secular humanism" should be classified as a "religion" for 
constitutional purposes. Still, his overall assessment provides a 
plausible interpretation of judicial decisions which on the one hand 
prohibit prayer, Bible reading, displays of the Ten Commandments, 
and even "moments of silence" in public schools, while on the other 
hand forbidding states either to exclude the teaching of evolution 
from public schools or to require "balanced treatment" of both 
evolution and creationism, and rejecting the claims of parents and 
students whose fundamentalist religious beliefs are undermined or 
offended by the schools' secular curriculum. Although commonly 
justified by reference to the ideal of "neutrality," such decisions are 
not "neutral" in any significant sense; it is far more plausible to 
view them as favoring a new secular orthodoxy over the older 
Christian one. In this respect, Rushdoony displays a clearer vision 
than do scholars or judges for whom a secular world view is so 
axiomatic that it seems "neutral." 
On the whole, however, Rushdoony's book is unhelpful, not 
because of its religious perspective, but rather because of its ten-
dency to fall into what orthodox Christianity regarded as a religious 
heresy: manicheanism.s This label covered an assortment of errors, 
whose common feature was a tendency to view the world in starkly 
dualistic terms. The realm of spirit was light and good; the material 
world was dark and evil. To be sure, there is a Christian perspective 
from which "the whole world lieth in wickedness." (1 John 5: 19) 
But a rigidly "light versus darkness" perspective, with its conse-
quent eagerness to condemn all that is of this world, is of little help 
in dealing with the most universal human concerns, which occur 
mostly in the shade. Thus, manicheanism is ultimately antithetical 
to the essence of Christianity, which holds that God did not reject 
or despise the world, but instead took upon himself humanity pre-
cisely so that he could understand, forgive, and redeem it. 
A stark dualism pervades Rushdoony's discussion. Most of 
the political and philosophical achievements upon which human 
8. For an interesting treatment of this heresy in its various guises. seeS. RU!';CJMA!'i, 
THE MEDIEVAL MANICHEE (1960). 
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freedom has been founded are simply relegated to the realm of 
darkness: Under the broad headings of the sovereignty of man or 
the idolatry of the state, Rushdoony dissolves all manner of distinc-
tions that might prove helpful in the practical realization of 
freedom, including religious freedom. For Rushdoony, Soviet com-
munism, German Naziism, and American democracy are not differ-
ent in principle, but are merely variations on a common humanistic 
theme. The postal service, Amtrak, Billy Graham, "and much, 
much more represent borrowings from Mussolini," whom 
Rushdoony regards as "the patron saint of 20th century human-
ism." The views about human nature of Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, 
Marx, and yes, even B.F. Skinner are lumped together for common 
condemnation under the heading of "the classical view of man." 
And at least since Woodrow Wilson, American presidents have 
been committed to the humanistic state, which is "antichristian in 
origin, conception, and administration." Thus, Jimmy Carter "de-
clared the radical irrelevance of Christianity to life over and over 
again," and Ronald Reagan presided over a "decline of religious 
freedom." The problem goes further back, however; for example, 
"Lincoln's contempt of religious liberty was obvious."9 
The problem is not just that Rushdoony shows little interest in 
dealing with the realm of darkness-i.e., the world as we know it; 
he offers only the dimmest vision of the realm of light. The basic 
principle is clear enough: Rushdoony believes that "the state ... 
must recognize the Lord Christ, the Messiah, and, like all things 
else, serve and obey Him." Consequently, "Christians must once 
again take over government in education, welfare, health, and other 
spheres." But what does this mean in concrete terms? What should 
our polity actually look like? Moses's Israel? Calvin's Geneva? 
John Winthrop's Massachusetts? Brigham Young's Deseret? 
Rushdoony never says. 
In an odd way, reading Rushdoony is a lot like reading Critical 
Legal Studies. You encounter stark and frightening "fundamental 
contradictions." You find the current state of affairs described 
under sweeping labels-"humanism," "liberalism"-that are used 
in unfamiliar ways, and then condemned under other sweeping la-
bels-"idolatry" and "statism," "hierarchy" and "reification"-
used in equally unfamiliar ways. You are startled to learn that you 
and your friends have all along been committed to insidious as-
sumptions and views-the divinity of the state, the subjectivity of 
all values along with the objectivity of legal reasoning-without 
9. Since the fact is "obvious," no explanation is apparently needed; and none is 
offered. 
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even knowing that you believed such things (and without quite un-
derstanding just what it is that you have unwittingly been believ-
ing). All of this is presented with a ferocity of conviction that leaves 
you unsettled. And at the end of it all, you have no idea how to go 
about correcting the situation. 10 Manicheanism, it seems, is a her-
esy not limited to Christians. 
III 
Perhaps the most unfortunate consequence of these books is 
that they may lend support to the view-a view that many are wont 
to adopt anyway-that history offers little help in understanding 
current constitutional issues. To be sure, good history is not easily 
come by. The historian has the difficult task of writing about the 
past but for the present; he must moderate a conversation between 
generations that may not speak in the same terms or, worse yet, 
may use the same terms but with different meanings. Conversing 
face-to-face with a friend is often hard enough; conversing with gen-
erations long dead is even harder. And when the conversation 
breaks down, as it frequently does in these books, the historian risks 
becoming merely a polemicist. 
But when the historical conversation prospers, it can be tre-
mendously illuminating; the analyses of American religious history 
offered by Mark DeWolfe Howe and Henry May are noteworthy 
examples. We can still learn a good deal from our forebears, but 
only by actually listening to them before we conscript them to serve 
in our current spiritual and political battles. 
A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-
TORY OF THE UNITED STATES. By Melvin I. Urofsky.1 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1988. Pp. xxii, 969. Cloth, 
$24.00; paperback, $12.00. 
Herman Befzz 
The legal realist movement had its origin in the philosophical 
10. Insofar as Rushdoony does offer prescriptions, they are much like those of CLS not 
only in the level of their abstraction but even, sometimes, in their substance. For instance, 
Rushdoony explains that we must "take government back from the state and restore to man 
his responsibility and freedom to be, in every sphere of life, a participating and governing 
power." Perhaps Rushdoony and Roberto Unger should collaborate on their next book. 
I. Professor of History, Virginia Commonwealth University. 
2. Professor of History, University of Maryland. Co-author of THE AMERICA~ CoN-
